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Introduction
In recent years incidents such as the collapse of the Rana Plaza garment factory 
in Bangladesh in April 2013 and the exposé by The Guardian of slavery and human 
traicking in the Thai shrimp industry in 2014 have focused attention on the 
supply chains of global corporations.  What has been reported less is that both of 
these incidents, and many others, took place within ‘certiied’ and audited supply 
chains.  The Thai shrimp in British supermarkets had been ‘ethically’ certiied by 
a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) that sets voluntary standards for the 
certiication of agricultural products and encourages producers to adopt ‘safe 
and sustainable practices’.  Similarly, in Bangladesh the Rana Plaza factory, which 
made clothes for Matalan, Primark and Walmart amongst many others, passed a 
compliance audit just months before it collapsed. 
Many key questions and serious concerns hang over the ethical audit regime. 
These include: are audits efective in identifying non-compliance and driving up 
standards, what does the audit regime mean for governments and NGOs, where 
does power lie within the audit regime and, ultimately, in whose interest is the 
ethical audit regime working?
To explore these issues we conducted 25 interviews (in 2012-14) with ethical 
auditors, business executives, NGOs and supplier irms in North America, the 
United Kingdom and China, as well as visiting factories in the Pearl River Delta 
region of China.
This new SPERI Global Political Economy Brief presents new evidence and key 
indings and argues that:
• Ultimately, the audit regime is ‘working’ for corporations, but failing workers 
and the planet. Labour abuses, poor working conditions and environmental 
degradation within global supply chains remain widespread.
• Audits are inefective tools for detecting, reporting, or correcting environmental 
and labour problems in supply chains.  They reinforce existing business models 
and preserve the global production status quo.
• Audits reinforce the labour and environmental problems that civil society NGOs 
are striving to improve.  
• The audit regime, with the involvement and support of NGOs, is reducing 
the role of states in regulating corporate behaviour and re-orientating global 
corporate governance towards the interests of private business and away from 
social goods. 
Part One of the Brief looks at the rise of ethical audits; Part Two considers the 
efectiveness of audits; and Part Three assesses the impact of the audit regime on 
global corporate governance.
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Part I - The move to ethical audits
• Beginning in the 1980s, a high proportion of global manufacturing has shifted 
to emerging economies (particularly China).  Large multinational companies 
typically outsource and subcontract the production of their goods to smaller 
low-cost, high-volume suppliers in developing countries.  Walmart, for example, 
sources its goods from over 100,000 global suppliers, who themselves source 
from an extensive global production network.
• As ofshore manufacturing has grown exponentially, exposés by NGOs and 
journalists of rampant child and ‘sweatshop’ labour and environmental 
malpractice in overseas production sites have led to calls for greater corporate 
transparency and accountability within global supply chains.  Prominent 
examples include the use of sweatshop labour to make clothes for Gap and 
exploitative work practices leading to multiple employee suicides at Foxconn, 
one of Apple and HPs main suppliers. 
• Following such exposés, corporations, supported by governments and 
international organisations, have launched Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) initiatives to position themselves as part of the solution to globalised 
production challenges. 
• Central to this has been the adoption of ethical auditing practices that purport 
to identify, correct and ultimately solve environmental and social problems in 
supply chains.  Brands began to hire independent (but often for-proit) auditors 
to monitor factories, develop codes of conduct for their suppliers and publish 
transparency and ethical reports.
• Similarly, over the last decade, partly out of frustration with the failings of 
international organisations and governments to adopt binding global business 
regulations, NGOs have come to accept industry-led CSR programmes and 
private audits as legitimate opportunities to detect abuses within supply chains, 
improve factory conditions and hold corporations accountable.  Governments 
have also moved to force NGOs to work with corporations as a requirement for 
receiving state funding.
• To monitor and verify standards, NGOs have developed transnational 
‘sustainable production’ certiication standards, such as the Rainforest Alliance 
certiication, Marine Stewardship Councils and Fair Labour programmes. 
These certiication standards are voluntary and rely on private audits, designed 
and paid for by corporations, to assess standards.  NGOs have also increasingly 
partnered with irms to develop bespoke voluntary programmes: Greenpeace 
has worked with Coca Cola to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and Oxfam 
with Unilever to integrate smallholder farmers into its supply chains.
• As such, the contemporary governance of global supply chains is increasingly 
reliant on an ethical and voluntary ‘benchmarking regime’ supported by 
both corporations and civil society groups, which has audit inspections as 
its cornerstone.  This auditing regime comprises company codes of supplier 
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conduct, voluntary certiications, standardised metrics (e.g. the Higg Index 
for ‘ethical’ clothing) and aggregated indexes for comparing corporate 
environmental and social performance (e.g.  the Global Reporting Initiative). 
• As such, audits have evolved from a management tool that multinational 
corporations used to measure, track and enforce internal organisational 
standards into a central mechanism of global state and non-state eforts to 
monitor standards within corporate supply chains.
Part II - The efectiveness of audits
Audit deception and a lack of accountability beyond the factory gates
Our interviews highlight how deception in the audit regime is widespread and 
known to corporations.  As Nike stated in a 2012 sustainability report, we have 
learned that monitoring does not bring about sustainable change. Often, it only 
reinforces a pattern of hiding problems.
• Our interviewees explained how decisions on audit scheduling, such as the 
time of year, frequency, and whether it is an announced or surprise audit, 
signiicantly afect indings. Pre-announced audits enable producers to falsify 
records and rid facilities of unauthorised agency contractors or exploited 
workers during audits.  As one informant noted, there could always be another 
group of people not on the books.
• This incomplete picture is not only a result of deception, but is structurally 
embedded within the audit regime.  Corporations control how deep within the 
supply chain audits are conducted; one auditor told us: We will audit as far 
down as the brand wants to go. 
• Many corporations design audit programmes that only inspect Tier 1 suppliers 
where the inal assembly of products takes place.  In 2012, for instance, US 
clothing company REI stated that it had audited a percentage of the Tier 1 
factories in our supply chain, but this only amounted to 27% of its total global 
supply chain.  
• By focusing on Tier 1 suppliers, most audits tend to exclude labour agencies 
and subcontractors further down the supply chain in low-value activities such 
as harvesting, processing, dyeing and mining.  Evidence from food, clothing and 
other industries indicates that the most exploited workers (e.g. forced and child 
labour) tend to be found in sites with complex subcontracting arrangements. 
Some evidence suggests audits have worsened conditions by shifting problems 
further down the supply chain.
• One of our informants described how audits to certify ‘Fair Trade’ products 
face this problem: “I’m going to go audit the crap out of your coop cofee bean 
company to make sure youre actually paying the farmers.  Who checks to see 
if the farmer is paying the pickers? Nobody!
4No. 1  Ethical Audits and the Supply Chains  of Global Corporations
• Audits often do not detect unauthorised subcontracting arrangements.  As one 
informant told us, following the Rana Plaza factory collapse, many of the brands 
that found themselves in the factory were as surprised as the next person to 
ind their brand in there. And the immediate defense was, ‘We never gave work 
to that factory and the people who gave them the work were in violation of the 
contract.
‘A diagnostic tool; it doesn’t ix things’
Our interviews suggest audits are: a) a weak tool at detecting non-compliance 
with corporate codes of conduct; b) a means of fostering a ‘checklist’ compliance 
approach to audits amongst suppliers; and c) are inefective at improving standards. 
• Auditors can usually only inspect areas that suppliers choose to show them and 
are often only able to speak to workers they happen to see.  One auditor told 
us that, because most audits are announced, or at least semi-announced, the 
factory usually has the opportunity to drill their people on what they need to 
say.
• Most audit irms have no investigative powers and so have limited capacity to 
verify that information presented to them, whether about safety conditions, 
contracts or environmental standards, is accurate.  One interviewee remarked: 
you have no powers of search so you cannot open a locked drawer  you can 
look at a record that says something but you wouldn’t be able to go and ind 
out whether its actually true. 
• Our interviews also highlighted the existence of a ‘checklist’ audit-compliance 
mentality.  A Director of a UK audit irm told us that the majority of audits are 
“not trying to ind things out, they’re trying to prove that something is not there”.
• Production for multiple retailers often takes place in the same factory, which 
means throughout a year factories can face many diferent audit teams, all with 
diferent standards and procedures.  We were told that, as a result, suppliers 
hire former auditors as consultants to help them meet and beat a system of 
multiple audits. 
• A growing number of sites have passed audits only to have major violations 
discovered or catastrophes take place soon after.  In 2008 60 forced labourers 
were discovered at Emmetts UK – a large vegetable grower and supplier to 
Tesco and Waitrose  only months after the farm had passed two successful 
audits.  In Bangladesh in 2012 the Tazreen Fashion factory was audited on behalf 
of Walmart.  Safety concerns were noted, but it was not recommended that the 
plant be closed.  Two months later, the factory burned down, killing over 100 
people.  
• The former Director of CSR for a major US retail company clearly emphasised 
the limits of audits: Within the social compliance world, it is now standard 
operating understanding that audits dont work to achieve change within 
organizations.  Similarly, a London-based manager at a global audit irm told 
us: “an audit is a diagnostic tool; it doesn’t ix things.  It doesn’t matter how 
many times we audit a factory, it doesnt mean theyre going to improve.
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The power lies with the corporation
Our interviews highlighted how audit contracts and the reporting of information 
gathered from audits demonstrate that the power within the audit regime lies with 
the corporation.
• Corporations can choose whether to use independent third-party auditors or 
in-house auditors.  Third-party auditors are generally deemed more neutral 
and hence legitimate, but even third-party auditors are not impartial.  Walmart, 
for example, applies its own criteria for selecting a list of whom it deems 
‘acceptable’ auditors.
• Auditors are bound by rigid conidentiality clauses and clients exercise 
full discretion over what audit information is reported.  Auditors produce 
standardised metrics and rankings that give the appearance of transparent 
and neutral monitoring; yet the information audits provide is selective and 
fundamentally shaped by the client.  Information about abuses and non-
compliance is rarely made available to governments or consumers and, as such, 
they are rarely resolved.
• Auditors typically ofer advice to help factories prepare action plans to 
address non-compliance indings.  However, auditors have no inluence over a 
company’s eventual business decisions; their advice can be ignored; and there 
is no external accountability for the action plans.  One auditor told us: We may 
well go in there and think, we can see what you need to do. But people arent 
going to do it just because weve said so.
A sharp divide between labour and environmental standards
Audits typically treat social concerns separately from environmental concerns. 
This divide allows companies to work towards, and highlight, improvements in one 
sphere – typically the environmental – whilst allowing social standards to persist 
or even worsen.
• A major 2012 study that evaluated 300 clothing brands on their eforts to address 
child and forced labour in their supply chains highlighted this divide.  Despite 
of making improvements around renewable energy and waste, Walmart’s 
traceability, transparency, and labour rights records ranked among the lowest 
in protecting against child and forced labour. 
• Similarly, the Lipton brand of tea has recently achieved the ‘green’ Rainforest 
Alliance Certiication, despite illegal labour practices in its supply chain being 
widely reported.
• Our interviews with companies in the Pearl River region in China further 
exposed this divide. We found that companies were investing in clean water 
and eco-friendly technology to secure ‘eco’ certiications and attract business, 
but that this often came at the expense of social goals.  Labour costs were being 
reduced through greater use of overtime and agency workers (who tend to be 
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lower-paid and face severe restrictions on their ability to assert their rights) 
and by replacing human labour with machinery.
Part Three – the impact of audits on global corporate governance
The growth of the audit regime is carving out an ever greater role for corporations 
in global corporate governance and enforcing an ever smaller role for states.  While 
the drivers motivating industry, NGOs and states vary, increasing participation by 
all three sets of actors relects an alignment of support for market-based global 
governance.  This Part of the Brief considers the drivers behind this trend. 
Corporations have claimed supply chain monitoring for themselves
Corporations have embraced CSR goals and ethical audits as an opportunity to 
preserve their business model and take responsibility for supply-chain monitoring 
out of the hands of governments.
• Corporate adoption of CSR has brought the supply chain ball back into their 
court, and away from governments.  One informant described Walmart’s CSR 
adoption: “By adopting the process that said ‘we got it, this is our ball, we’re 
going to do something about supply chain  Walmart, on behalf of the entire 
retail industry, said, ‘this is our problem. This isn’t a government regulatory 
problem. This isnt Chinas problem, this isnt Vietnams problem. This is our 
problem. We have the power, resources, and ability to deal with it and we will.
• Through the presentation of active monitoring and ‘continuous improvement’, 
corporations have been able to delect pressure for stricter state and 
international regulation that might otherwise curb business growth.  This 
enables the preservation of existing business models and proits.
• Adopting ethical audits has also enabled corporations to position themselves 
as responsible companies.  This helps drive sales as retailers increasingly 
recognise the importance of ‘eco’ and ‘ethical’ products for consumers.  A 2013 
study of 1000 brands found that 28% of brand value relates to corporate social 
responsibility.
State support for corporate self-governance
In the face of iscal restraints and jurisdictional constraints, states are increasingly 
entrusting corporations to govern themselves, either by supplementing oicial 
methods or by substituting their own inspection and monitoring responsibilities. 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) reports a steep downturn in labour 
inspections in both the global South and North.  This trend towards corporate self-
governance is illustrated by the increasing adoption of voluntary corporate codes 
of conduct by states and international bodies: 
• Central and local governments in China have signed memorandum of 
understanding agreements with retailers such as Starbucks and IKEA to roll 
out their sustainable supply chain commitments and ethical audit programs to 
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suppliers across China.  The agreements, based on private audits, are used as a 
supplementary policy instrument to help encourage domestic Chinese irms to 
improve social and environmental practices.
• Regional and national governments in Europe and North and South America 
have adopted forest certiication audit programmes as a supplement and in 
some cases as a replacement for state forestry inspections and enforcement. 
The EU and the US are adopting private audit-enforcement mechanisms into 
new laws to determine the legality of imported timber.
• There is also a growing adoption of audit-based initiatives at the global level. 
The United Nations’ voluntary Global Compact – ‘the world’s largest corporate 
sustainability initiative’ – is wholly based upon the use of audit-based initiatives.
The legitimising role of NGOs
Our interviews suggest that by working with corporations and governments NGOs 
have served to deepen the credibility and legitimacy of audit-based industry-led 
governance of corporations.
• Every NGO multi-stakeholder transnational certiication programme, whether 
for bananas, timber, ish or diamonds, relies on private audits to check and 
verify standards. 
• NGOs have worked with corporations and governments to develop such 
initiatives and have co-operated bilaterally with corporations to design their 
codes of conduct.
• As such, NGOs have arguably helped to codify and neutralise corporations’ poor 
social and environmental records and, in so doing, have undermined the role of 
states in global corporate governance.
Conclusion
The increasing use of private audits to monitor supply chains is serving to restructure 
the global regulatory system to privilege the private interests of business growth, 
proit and market advantage over the public interest and social goods of improving 
labour standards, general wellbeing and ecological protection. In a nutshell, the 
audit regime is ‘working’ for corporations, but failing workers and the planet.
• The increasing use of audits as a tool of governance is bolstering corporate 
interests and inluence over consumers and policymakers and, ultimately, 
deepens corporations’ power to make their own rules and norms and evaluate 
and report on their own performance.
• Whilst audits give the impression of active supply-chain monitoring and 
‘continuous improvement’, the regime actually reinforces endemic problems 
in supply chains.  It delects pressure for stricter, state-based regulation and 
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legitimises unsustainable global production models – in particular, a retail 
economy that promotes consumption and environmental degradation. 
• Through voluntary certiication programmes, and with state support, the 
structural problems within the audit regime – deception, failing to detect or 
ignoring problems within supply chains, and a compliance mentality – are being 
swiftly institutionalised within global governance mechanisms.
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